Chapter Two: Political Motivations? British, American and Soviet Conduct
Investigating the Investigations
The way in which the British investigations into Hitler's death were conducted has been criticized by various authors. Conspiracy theorists such as Levenda have argued that political motivations overshadowed the need to discover the truth about Hitler's death and that the investigations were rushed to counter Soviet claims of Hitler’s survival in the British Zone of Germany. 1 Williams argues that the Allies allowed Hitler to escape in return for Nazi Intelligence to use against the Soviets in the coming Cold War. 2 O'Donnell criticized Allied interrogators for lacking objectivity and asking the wrong questions. 3 In this chapter, the aims and conduct of British Intelligence and their co-operation with the Americans and the Soviets during the Hitler investigations will be analyzed in order to determine whether there is any truth to such accusations of poor British conduct and political motivations.
Although large scale British investigations into Hitler’s death did not begin until Trevor Roper was appointed by Dick White to undertake them in September 1945, British Intelligence was gathering evidence concerning Hitler’s death prior to Trevor-Roper’s involvement. Nevertheless, it was the Soviet accusation that Hitler was hiding in the British Zone that inspired White, then head of Counter-Intelligence in the British Zone of Germany, to ask Trevor-Roper to initiate his thorough investigation into Hitler’s death. 4 In a letter to Thomas "Tar" Robertson, asking whether Trevor-Roper could be made available to lead the Hitler investigations, White refers to a "considerable amount of comment in the press" speculating "whether or not Hitler is still living". 5 He describes Trevor-Roper as a "first-rate chap" who has "kept the closest tabs on the matter" and is already familiar with reports on various Nazis relevant to the Hitler case. This demonstrates that the claims of conspiracy theorists that Trevor-Roper was unsuitable to lead the investigations are incorrect. Indeed, White was impressed by an Intelligence report written by Trevor-Roper concerning Nazi secret Intelligence during the war. 6 White further stated that it would be useful for "quadripartite" discussion with the Soviets who had expressed the desire to "review the evidence on the subject with the other occupational powers" to undertake a detailed investigation. White’s desire to review evidence with the Soviets is instructive for section III of this chapter, as will be demonstrated, the desire to maintain co-operation with the Soviets on wider political issues was hindered by Soviet accusations of Hitler’s survival in the British Zone. Indeed, as Sean Greenwood points out, at this time, many British officials sought to maintain co-operation with the Soviets. 7 Secondly, the desire to prevent a "Hitler Myth" is mentioned in Trevor-Roper’s book and throughout his investigations. 8 Indeed, the idea of Hitler still living, or dying a "heroic" death, was a hindrance to the Anglo-American denazification programme in occupied Germany that was underway at the time. Thirdly, White claims that the investigations would be of "historical interest", a motive which is referred to throughout the investigations. Although political considerations did provide the impetus for the initiation of Trevor Roper’s investigations, this does not mean that political motivations affected the objectivity of the evidence or the conclusions he produced. In order to determine this, detailed analysis of the investigations must be conducted.
In 1946, Trevor-Roper’s book was referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC], a powerful Intelligence co-ordinating body attended by the heads of all British Intelligence sections and the Foreign Office, in order to determine the desirability of its publication and ensure that any material contained within would not jeopardize the secrecy of the intelligence services. 9 White suggested to the JIC that its publication was desirable as it may prevent the creation of a "Hitler Myth" which was "the object" of "the original Press release" [this refers to Trevor-Roper’s initial Intelligence report on the Führer’s death given to the Quadripartite Intelligence Committee [QIC] and the press in modified form on 1 November 1945]. 10 The desire to prevent a "Hitler Myth" was re-iterated at the JIC meeting on 14 June 1946. 11 It was also suggested that the book had "propaganda value" and may be translated into German "for dissemination as propaganda". This view was strongly supported by the Foreign Office. At face value, this would appear to confirm Levenda’s argument that the British investigations were obstructed by political motivations. However, Trevor-Roper told the JIC that "the book is intended as history rather than propaganda; I think the facts are true as given; and I have been more concerned to understand the events and their causes and relations, than to push a point of view". 12 This shows that Trevor-Roper was not influenced by political considerations but intended to establish historical truth, which he believed he achieved through his conclusions about Hitler’s death. Trevor-Roper further stated that"‘the truth is the best…form of propaganda". 13 By this, he was implying that the truth of how Hitler died, by committing suicide whilst old men and young boys continued to fight for him, would be enough to dissuade the German people from reviving Nazism or revering Hitler, without embellishing the story. Therefore, Levenda's claim that British Intelligence invented the story of Hitler’s death for political purposes is incorrect. This view is supported by further analysis of Trevor-Roper’s investigations.
Although Trevor-Roper clearly did not consider his investigations or conclusions to be influenced by political considerations, the Foreign Office did not share this view. As Greenwood points out, in 1945 most Foreign Office officials believed the main threat to Britain’s security was the revival of an aggressive Germany and therefore desired good relations with the Soviets. 14 On the other hand, Greenwood argues that British military Intelligence perceived the Soviets to be the main threat to Britain’s future security. 15 Such disagreements were evident in some aspects of the Hitler investigations, particularly regarding the publication of Hitler’s wills. Indeed, when three copies of Hitler’s wills were discovered following a well-documented Anglo-American joint Intelligence operation conducted by Trevor-Roper, a lengthy dispute ensued between the Foreign Office and British military Intelligence regarding whether they should be published. In a brief submitted to the JIC, the Foreign Office argued for "complete suppression [of the wills] if feasible, in order to deny Hitler this posthumous weapon which might assist the renaissance of a nationalist Germany in twenty years time". 16 Major-General "Tubby" Lethbridge, head of Intelligence Division [ID] in Germany, on the other hand, argued for "publication now" as the story could be leaked at a future date when "the German people might be more receptive to a Hitler mystique than they are today". 17 However, whilst the Foreign Office was arguing for suppression, the wills were released to the press by General Lucian Truscott [Commanding General of American 3rd Army, Munich]. Adam Sisman argues that this was part of a deliberate tactic by Trevor-Roper who wanted the documents to be published and knowing that the Foreign Office favoured suppression, captured the wills in the American Zone, knowing that they would be published as an American scoop.18 However, this interpretation, as will be shown, is incorrect. Despite the publication of the wills, the Foreign Office continued to argue that "the less public notice the documents receive in Germany, inside or outside, so much the better". 19 Indeed, the Foreign Office attempted to co-ordinate policy with Washington, who agreed that although the wills had already been published, tight restriction of facsimiles and suppression of the original copies should now be implemented. 20 The Foreign Office was concerned that the wills could become "objects of great sentimental and political value" to many Germans and even contemplated destroying the originals. 21 The War Office on the other hand, took the complete opposite approach.
Major-General Gerald Templer believed the wills were "not such bad documents" and "apart from the ravings against international Jewry, fairly dignified". 22 Templer believed they should be published. Lethbridge agreed, adding "I feel no real harm will come of it" as two other copies were yet to be found and could be published at a less advantageous moment when the Germans were not "down and out". 23 The danger of this occurring was highlighted by a threatening anonymous letter received by Heinrich Kopf [Oberpräsident of Hanover] in December 1945. The letter stated that "Bormann brought us the testament of our beloved Führer" and argued that "the Anglo-American thieves stole from us the Atom-Bomb", threatened to hang Kopf and other "traitors" from lamp-posts and claimed that Hitler’s will dictates the future action to establish 'the National Socialist Great German Reich'. 24 Trevor-Roper concluded that the author had not read the will and "invented its contents" and the story of its delivery "in order to give apparent authority to a threatening letter". 25 This, Trevor-Roper argued, showed "the advantage of publishing the real document!". Major Ramsbotham confirmed that British Intelligence was indeed hoping to publish the wills. 26 Consequently, a draft press hand out was prepared, giving a detailed analysis of their contents. 27
When the wills were leaked by Truscott, the War Office atmosphere appeared to be one of confusion. Indeed, British Intelligence had agreed with USFET that the wills would be kept Top Secret pending further instructions. However, the "story broke when [the] British Rep" [presumably Trevor-Roper] "had returned to USFET who were unable to explain why their instructions to Third U.S. Army had been disregarded". 28 Nevertheless, British Intelligence in Germany also gave a hand out along with copies of the wills to the press when the American story broke. 29 This was perhaps due to the intense rivalry between Anglo-American Intelligence services, with British Intelligence not wanting America to take all the credit. One "Daily Telegraph" article somewhat confirms this interpretation in stating that "following the announcement" that "Hitler’s wills" had been "seized by United States Intelligence Officers, it was revealed tonight that British Intelligence were already in possession of a copy of the two testaments". 30 Clearly, British Intelligence wanted it to be known that they had discovered the wills before the Americans. The Foreign Office was evidentially not consulted to ask if British information on the wills could be published and contacted the War Office in an attempt to suppress the documents. 31 British Intelligence however, was irritated by the Foreign Office being so "touchy" and reluctantly ordered that all outstanding copies due to be distributed should be frozen. 32 This, fortunately for some Intelligence officers, did not prevent many copies being distributed as souvenirs. 33 One Intelligence officer asked the Foreign Office if an original copy of the will could be exhibited at the Carlton Hotel. 34 The Foreign Office, probably incensed by this late consultation, rejected the proposal in line with its policy of suppression. 35 Despite initial opposition from the Foreign Office at meetings of the JIC, the position of the War Office eventually triumphed as the wills were published in Trevor-Roper’s book. 36
Major internal disagreements between British Intelligence regarding Hitler’s death however were rare. Throughout the investigations, evidence was shared between MI5, MI6, Government Communications Headquarters [GCHQ], the War Office and the Foreign Office. Disputes between the Foreign Office regarding the use of propaganda and the political suppression of evidence, as made clear by Trevor-Roper’s statements to the JIC, did not affect the overall objectivity and conclusions of the investigations. Trevor-Roper’s objectivity even triumphed over the staunch Foreign Office position regarding Hitler’s wills. However, it is now essential to analyze the nature of Anglo-American co-operation which may shed further light on why historians such as O’Donnell believe that Allied interrogators asked the wrong questions and the extent to which Anglo-American intelligence rivalry may have hindered the investigations.
Anglo-American Solidarity
America shared the same motives as Britain in aiding Trevor-Roper’s investigations into Hitler’s death. Indeed, American motivations are clearly stated on numerous detailed reports obtained from American interrogations of Hitler’s doctors and dentists sent to the War Office as follows:
a) Data useful for the identification of Hitler or his remains;
b) Further material for the debunking of numerous Hitler Myths;
c) The knowledge needed to expose those frauds who in later years may claim to be Hitler, or who may claim to have seen him or talked to him;
d) Research material for the historian, the doctor and the scientist interested in Hitler. 37
Clearly, American and British Intelligence intended historians to use the evidence they collected in their investigations to debunk future rumours of Hitler’s survival. The use of the word "frauds" demonstrates that American Intelligence genuinely believed that rumours of Hitler’s survival were false and no conspiratorial motives encompassed their investigations, as some authors have argued. Such reports and American assistance were considered to be of great importance to Trevor-Roper’s investigations as congratulatory letters following the successful locating of Hitler’s wills demonstrate. For example, Brigadier Haylor thanked Colonel Sands of USFET for "the splendid co-operation and assistance" he gave to British intelligence officers during the Hitler investigations. 38 Haylor claimed that Trevor-Roper "never failed to receive the fullest degree of co-operation and assistance" from the Counter Intelligence Corps [CIC] and that thanks to American assistance the investigations were "concluded within a surprisingly short space of time". American assistance was indeed valuable as it enabled British Intelligence to operate over a much larger area, maintain surveillance on individuals for longer periods of time and increased the chances of capturing key eyewitnesses by the extension of manpower into the American Zone of Germany. 39 Trevor-Roper repeats this positive interpretation of Anglo-American co-operation in "The Last Days of Hitler". 40 However, evidence in recently declassified documents suggests that Anglo-American co-operation was not without some major difficulties.
In a letter to Brian Melland, head of the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office, Trevor Roper expressed views which contradict the dominant narrative in the historiography regarding Anglo-American co-operation during the investigations into Hitler’s death. The views he expressed may shed further light as to why O’Donnell believes the Allies asked the wrong questions. After commenting on textual discrepancies between the American and British held copies of Hitler’s will, Trevor-Roper explained "…I never saw the original which is now in American hands. There is a long history behind this, which, for reasons of Anglo-American solidarity, I have never published". 41 Trevor-Roper claimed that: "General Truscott…was clearly displeased by the fact that a British officer had discovered these documents in his area and determined to claim the entire credit for his own forces. He therefore behaved in a very curious way. First, he had the documents…shut away in a safe and I was not allowed to see them. Then, in direct contradiction to the assurances given to me that nothing would be published till the British and American texts had been compared, immediately after I had left, sent for the American press and published the whole discovery as a brilliant coup by the U.S. 6th Army. This naturally led to some indignation in the British zone, and somebody in a high place [presumably Truscott], in order to defend his action, evidentially made unspecific charges against me which resulted in my never visiting the American zone again". 42
This challenges the dominant narrative of the Anglo-American Intelligence operation to locate Hitler’s wills which is frequently presented as a triumph of Intelligence co-operation, and also the narrative given in Trevor-Roper’s biography, which implies Trevor-Roper intended to have the wills published by capturing them in the American Zone. 43 It also demonstrates the rivalry between Anglo American Intelligence services, outlined by historians such as Stephen Dorril who argues that both were in competition to become the top Intelligence service in Germany. 44 Such competitiveness had serious implications for the Hitler investigations, as Trevor-Roper explained in further correspondence with Melland. When asked by Melland if he could contact Gerda Christian [Hitler’s secretary] to obtain information on the discrepancies in Hitler’s wills, Trevor-Roper explained that Christian was, "located later when it was no longer possible for me to go into the U.S. zone…she was therefore interrogated by the U.S. authorities on a brief supplied by me. This, of course, was not very satisfactory, as the interrogators did not have the necessary background to pursue such topics as might emerge during interrogation, or to detect possible errors or lies at the time. Indeed, this fact was a handicap in respect of all prisoners captured after the end of 1945. The most serious case was that of Axmann…the one man who claimed to have seen Bormann dead, was interrogated on my brief only, by a U.S. interrogator without any background knowledge". 45
The inability to interrogate certain witnesses caused some embarrassment for Trevor-Roper. For example, Hanna Reitsch [the famous Luftwaffe pilot who visited Hitler in the Bunker] wrote a letter to "Die Welt" in October 1947, denying that she had ever spoken to Trevor-Roper and completely disowned the account attributed to her in Trevor-Roper’s book. 46 This has been used by conspiracy theorists to outline the supposed unreliability of Trevor-Roper’s investigations. 47 At the time, it caused some German readers of Trevor-Roper’s book to doubt his conclusions. 48 However, Trevor Roper published a reply to Reitsch explaining that she was interrogated by an American interrogator on a brief supplied by him. 49 Moreover, she sought to distance herself from the interrogation as it emphasized her closeness to Hitler, which was hindering her attempts to obtain employment. Furthermore, Reitsch claimed that her account was crucially important to Trevor-Roper’s book; a statement which Trevor-Roper correctly argued was not true. Another issue caused by the American refusal to allow Trevor-Roper to interrogate witnesses was slow information sharing. Indeed, throughout the investigations, British Intelligence officers complained about USFET taking too long to deliver answers to interrogation briefs. On one occasion, Trevor-Roper asked MI5 to "ginger up" USFET because "they gradually get callous to prods, so one has to prod harder each time I find!" 50
Trevor-Roper’s unpublished account of "Anglo-American Solidarity" appears to be reliable, as it is written in confidence to Melland, who was Trevor-Roper’s cousin. 51 It is further confirmed by the initial War Office confusion when the wills were published and provides the only explanation available to historians as to why Trevor-Roper did not interrogate some eyewitnesses directly. This new evidence is of significant historical value, as it demonstrates, from Trevor-Roper’s perspective, the reason why some authors may feel the Allies asked the wrong questions, which appears, in Melland’s words, to be American "childishness". However, although inconvenient and a "handicap" American interrogation reports still provided useful evidence in determining Hitler’s death. Despite some tensions, the joint Anglo-American investigations into Hitler’s death managed to uncover a remarkable amount of evidence in a small space of time. By far a larger hindrance to the Hitler investigations than Anglo-American Intelligence rivalry [which was more about who collected and supplied the evidence than the evidence itself], was Soviet conduct.
Appeasing the Soviets? British Intelligence and Soviet Conduct
On 23 May 1945, the JIC presented a report on "relations with the Russians" to the War Cabinet. It argued that Britain should be "more tough" with the Soviets and "nothing should be given to the Russians gratuitously". 52 Further, "no Russian request should normally be granted unless some request of ours to which we attach importance is granted in connection with it". It rightly predicted that "with the end of the war in Germany" political events would have an "even greater effect upon the attitude of the Russian military authorities". Overall, it argued that Britain should "drive a hard bargain" and imply a "strict principle of reciprocity" when negotiating with the Soviets. This evidence supports Aldrich’s argument that the post-war planning of the military and intelligence services was conditioned by prejudices inherited during inter-war espionage activities against the Bolsheviks. 53 It is therefore surprising to see the attitudes towards the Soviets from British Intelligence during the Hitler investigations.
Documentary evidence suggests that in depth British investigations into Hitler’s death did not begin until September 1945 because British officials were waiting for evidence to be provided by the Soviets. Indeed, on 30 May 1945, MI6 received a report from "our American friends" detailing Hitler’s dental information [obtained from the American interrogation of Dr. Hugo Blaschke, Hitler’s dentist]. 54 This information was forwarded to the War Office and MI14 [thus illustrating the co operation between British Intelligence services]. MI14, knowing that "the Russians have apparently been trying to identify Hitler’s body from his dental records", suggested that the information should be given to the Soviets as "it may be of assistance to them in settling an issue of equal interest to all the Allies". 55 It is unclear if this information was given to the Soviets as objections were raised due to it originating from an American "secret source". 56 However, the willingness to provide evidence to the Soviets despite earlier JIC recommendations demonstrates a more open-minded attitude towards them during the Hitler investigations, and a belief that they would provide evidence to the Allies once their investigations were complete. This belief may have inspired British enthusiasm over an "ingenious" suggestion given to Aneurin Bevan by Graham Hodgson [head of the X-Ray department of the British Red Cross] that X-Rays of Hitler’s skull could be used to compare the "skull in Berlin" supposedly found by the Soviets and thus certify the identity of Hitler. 57 This message was passed from the Foreign Office to the War Office [further demonstrating inter-service co-operation] with great enthusiasm, thus arguably showing that British Intelligence expected the Soviets to allow them access to forensic evidence at some point.
British and American officials waited for Soviet confirmation of Hitler’s death as contradictory reports were collected by MI14 and the Foreign Office regarding whether Hitler was alive or if the Soviets had discovered his corpse and confirmed his method of death. On 6 June 1945 Soviet officers, including one of Zhukov’s staff officers, informed British newspapers that Hitler’s body had been found and doctors confirmed he had died from poison. 58 On the same day, Stalin told Harry Hopkins that Hitler was still alive. 59 Then, Zhukov announced on 9 June that Hitler’s body had not been found and he could have flown away at the last moment. 60 At the Potsdam Conference in July, Stalin re-iterated that Hitler could have escaped to Spain or Argentina. 61 The damage done by such statements was clear to British officials. Newspapers collected by the Foreign Office said many people in Berlin believed Hitler was still alive. 62 One Civil Communications intercept showed that some Germans doubted Hitler was dead because "the Russians swear by all that is holy that he is still alive". 63 Soviet behaviour even made one Foreign Office official doubt Hitler’s death as he stated "the Russians are, up to now, very dubious as to the exact cause of Hitler’s death, if he is dead". 64 A SHAEF report on Hitler’s death noted "it is impossible to give any authoritative account of Hitler’s last days as evidence is still accumulating…much of the evidence, too, is in Russian hands". 65 Yet, British Intelligence still believed Hitler was dead, despite Soviet skepticism. Nevertheless, one Foreign Office official worried "can we say we believe Hitler to be dead without annoying the Russians, whose press seem to be always suggesting the contrary?". 66 This concern for the possible deterioration of Anglo-Soviet relations provides credence to Greenwood’s argument that maintaining good relations with the Soviets was a key objective of the Foreign Office. However, the Soviet accusation that Hitler was living in the British Zone must have convinced British officials that the Soviets could not be trusted to provide an objective account of Hitler’s death and put too much strain on Anglo-Soviet relations for British intelligence to wait for a conclusive Soviet statement any longer. 67 Therefore, Trevor-Roper’s investigations were launched, but they were not tainted by anti-Soviet prejudice.
From the outset of Trevor-Roper’s investigations, the Soviets informed Dick White that they had "no satisfactory evidence" that Hitler was dead and expressed the desire to share information on Hitler’s death with the other occupational powers, White agreed to share British evidence. 68 Therefore, throughout Trevor-Roper’s investigations, the Soviets were consulted about British evidence at the QIC, an Intelligence sharing organization containing representatives from all the occupying powers in Berlin. Despite Soviet accusations that Britain was hiding Hitler and the JIC recommendation of strict reciprocity, British Intelligence continued to pass evidence to the Soviets. 69 They also continued to show interest in searching for X-Rays of Hitler’s skull. 70 This shows that prior to the tabling of Trevor-Roper’s conclusions at the QIC on 1 November 1945, British Intelligence still, despite earlier Soviet accusations, expected to gain eventual access to forensic evidence. However, when Trevor-Roper’s report [which formed the basis of his book] was tabled, the Soviets imply stated "very interesting". 71 Another QIC meeting was held on 10 November in which British Iintelligence asked the Soviets if they hold and could make available for interrogation key eyewitnesses such as Heinz Linge [Hitler’s valet] and declare any other evidence they possess on Hitler’s death. 72 By 30 November "no reaction" had been received from the Soviets. 73 Surprisingly in December 1945, American Intelligence officers convinced Soviet General Sidnev to allow British, American and French representatives to dig in the Reichschancellery garden. 74 However, only one day’s digging was carried out "because on the next day the Russians, for a reason which has never been explained prevented the entrance of the party". On 2 January 1946, numerous newspapers in Berlin, including "Russian controlled" papers, reported that Hitler’s body had been identified "without the possibility of doubt" by his dentist. 75 War Office staff complained that "clearly the Russians can have told us nothing" and demanded a statement from them. Attempts were made to telephone numerous Russian officers but British Intelligence received evasive responses such as "we have no official information". 76 The Soviets eventually stopped answering the phone. British Intelligence was particularly angry as "each Ally undertook to supply any forthcoming information" on Hitler’s death "at once to other representatives" and "the Russians have promised that they would let us know if any further information" about Hitler’s death "came to their notice". 77 At the next QIC meeting, the Soviets were asked about the story but simply stated that "they had no information of this story and that the report must be the imagination of a newspaper reporter". 78 The Soviets "guaranteed" to inform the QIC of any further information they obtained relating to Hitler’s death and ironically argued that "rumours should be the subject of official denial in the Press".
Despite the rumours of Hitler’s survival, the accusation of Hitler living in the British Zone and the Soviets clearly withholding information from British Intelligence, the War Office continued to supply evidence to the Soviets. For example, in June 1946, the Soviets asked British intelligence to give them copies of an interrogation report "rendered from Hitler’s former adjutant, von Below". 79 The British representative asked the War Office to "kindly" consider this request from our "Russian Allies" and the War Office showed a desire to reply to the request "reasonably quickly" and did so. 80 The JIC report of May 1945 was therefore disregarded. This arguably demonstrates a remarkable objectivity on the part of British intelligence during the Hitler investigations. Despite wider Cold War tensions, British Intelligence was willing to co-operate with the Soviets, even when evidence was not forthcoming from Moscow and they were being consistently ignored.
No documentary evidence has yet been produced to explain why the Soviets repeatedly stated that Hitler was alive, despite possessing large quantities of evidence to the contrary. 81 The Foreign Office could not explain why "Russia has been…putting out reports that Hitler is alive, for some obscure reason of their own" and were "unclear what motive" the Soviets had in "spreading lies". 82 Historical speculation has therefore been widespread. Most historians argue that Stalin’s political aims provided the motive for such rumours. Indeed, by claiming Hitler was alive, Stalin could strengthen his claims to territory in Germany during disagreements with Britain by suggesting it would be safer for the Soviets to remain, undermine perceived political opponents such as Zhukov who had earlier claimed that Hitler was dead, attack political enemies by claiming Hitler was in Spain or Argentina and provide an external threat advantageous to totalitarian governmental systems. 83 Other historians have argued that Stalin wished to maintain the wartime alliance by preserving the common enemy of Hitler or that he genuinely believed Hitler had escaped. 84 However, the 2009 DNA results provide weight to one particular interpretation of Soviet conduct, that they were unhappy with the quality of their investigations and did not want their evidence to be scrutinized by the West. 85
The British investigations into Hitler’s death were of great political significance due to the context of Soviet accusations in which they were conducted. 86 However, they were not conducted with political bias, but rather with remarkable objectivity, even towards the Soviets. Any attempts to turn Trevor Roper’s findings into propaganda by the Foreign Office were refuted by Intelligence officers, including Trevor-Roper himself, as recently declassified MI5 documents revealed. Survival rumours and alternative versions of Hitler’s death, were not ignored in order to convey a rushed, preconceived conclusion to counter Soviet claims of Hitler’s survival. They were investigated thoroughly by British intelligence and all found to be false. Despite some issues of Anglo-American intelligence rivalry which hindered the collection of evidence, there is no evidence to suggest that the evidence obtained during the British investigations was tainted by political motivations. The objectivity with which British Intelligence conducted their investigations into Hitler’s death suggests that if the evidence pointed to Hitler’s escape or murder, then Trevor-Roper would have concluded accordingly – but it did not.
1 Levenda, Ratline, pp. 22,25,31,34.
2 Dunstan and Williams, Wolf, p. XXX.
3 O’Donnell, Bunker, p. 14.
4 Sisman, Trevor-Roper, p. 133. 5 TNA, WO 208/3787, White to Robertson [10/09/1945].
6 Sisman, Trevor-Roper, p. 126.
7 Sean Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War [London: Macmillan, 2000], p. 6.
8 Trevor-Roper, Hitler, pp. lviii, 205.
9 Dorril, MI6, p. 67.
10 TNA, KV 4/354, Minute from MI5 to JIC [03/06/1946].
11 TNA, KV 4/354, JIC Minutes (14/06/1946).
12 TNA, KV 4/354, JIC Minutes (24/06/1946) and Trevor-Roper to White [19/06/1946].
13 Ibid.
14 Greenwood, Britain, pp. 6,8,11.
15 Ibid, p. 10.
16 TNA, CAB 146/438, 'Hitler’s Will: Points From Foreign Office Papers' [31/12/1945].
17 Ibid. See also Aldrich, Hidden, p. 181; Dorril, MI6, p. 99.
18 Sisman, Trevor-Roper, pp. 140-141.
19 TNA, CAB 146/438, FO to Washington [08/01/1946].
20 TNA, CAB 146/438, MI4, Top Secret Cipher Telegram [16/02/1946].
21 TNA, CAB 146/438, FO to Washington [08/01/1946].
22 TNA, WO 208/3788, Templer to Lethbridge [08/12/1945]. Further information on Templer in Dorril, MI6, p. 98.
23 TNA, WO 208/3788, Lethbridge to Templer [04/12/1945].
24 TNA, WO 208/3789, Anonymous letter to Kopf [22/12/1945].
25 TNA, WO 208/3789, Trevor-Roper to Intelligence Bureau [IB] [23/01/1946].
26 TNA, WO 208/3789, Ramsbotham to Wethered [18/12/1945].
27 TNA, WO 208/3788, 'The Hitler Case' [02/12/1945] and TNA, WO 208/3789, 'Draft for Press Hand Out', p. 123.
28 TNA, WO 208/3789, Secret Signal, Central Intelligence Bureau [CIB] [08/01/1946].
29 TNA, WO 208/3789, Concomb to WO [22/01/1926] and TNA, WO 208/3781, 'Hitler’s Will', p. 50.
30 TNA, CAB 146/438, Daily Telegraph [31/12/1945].
31 TNA, WO 208/3781, FO to WO 'This Document Must Not Be Reproduced' [03/02/1946].
32 TNA, WO 208/3781, Lethbridge to Foord [22/01/1946].
33 TNA, WO 208/3788, WO to CIB [23/11/1945] and TNA, WO 208/3789, 'Hitler’s Wills' [07/01/1946].
34 TNA, WO 208/3789, Concomb to WO [22/01/1946].
35 TNA, CAB 146/438, 'Hitler’s Will: Points From Foreign Office Papers', pp. 3-4.
36 TNA, KV 4/354, JIC Minutes [14/06/1946] and JIC Minutes [24/06/1946].
37 TNA, WO 208/3789, USFET, "Hitler As Seen By His Doctors" [29/11/1945] and TNA, WO 208/3790, USFET, 'Hitler’s Teeth' and TNA, WO 208/3787, USFET, 'Hitler As Seen By His Doctors' [15/10/1945]. 38 TNA, WO 208/3789, Haylor to Sands [08/01/1946].
39 TNA, WO 208/3787, 'Present position of enquiry and recommendations for further action in British and U.S. Zone', p. 30 and 'Frau Christian', p. 147.
40 Trevor-Roper, Hitler, p. xx.
41 TNA, CAB 146/438, Trevor-Roper to Melland [28/03/1966].
42 Ibid.
43 Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, America’s Secret Army: The Untold Story of the Counter Intelligence Corps [London: Fontana, 1990], p. 308.
44 Dorril, MI6, p. 104.
45 TNA, CAB 146/438, Trevor-Roper to Melland [08/04/1966].
46 TNA, KV 4/354, Hodges to MI5 [04/11/1947]. Also in TNA, WO 208/3791.
47 Dunstan and Williams, Wolf, p. XXI.
48 TNA, FO 938/196, 299/MG/8482/PRISC [03/03/1948]. 49 TNA, KV 4/354, Trevor-Roper reply to Reitsch, published in Die Welt [14//10/1947].
50 TNA, KV 4/354, Trevor-Roper, Christ Church, Oxford [01/08/1946].
51 Sisman, Trevor-Roper, p. 222.
52 TNA, CAB 79/33, JIC Report [23/05/1945].
53 Aldrich, Hidden, pp. 21-22,24,37,49,69.
54 TNA, WO 208/4475, MI6 Political Report [07/06/1945].
55 TNA, WO 208/4475, MI14 [13/07/1945].
56 TNA, WO 208/4475, DDMI Minutes [14/07/1945].
57 TNA, FO 371/46749, Hodgson to Bevan. See also TNA, WO 208/3781 and TNA, WO 208/3787, pp. 88-89.
58 TNA, FO 371/46748, The Times [07/06/1945] also in TNA, WO 208/4475. See also McKale, Survival, p. 46.
59 McKale, Survival, p. 49.
60 Petrova and Watson, Death, p. 44.
61 Ibid.
62 TNA, FO 371/46748, The Times [09/07/1945].
63 TNA, WO 208/3790, Censorship Civil Communications [10/01/1946].
64 TNA, FO 371/46748, FO Minutes [16/05/1945].
65 TNA, FO 371/46749, 'Hitler’s Last Days', SHAEF Memorandum [30/07/1945].
66 TNA, FO 371/46749, Draft Reply to Parliamentary Question [15/10/1945].
67 Sisman, Trevor-Roper, p. 133.
68 TNA, WO 208/3787, White to Robertson [10/09/1945].
69 TNA, WO 208/3787, GSI HQ [24/10/1945].
70 TNA, WO 208/3787, 'Hitler’s Death' [22/10/1945].
71 Sisman, Trevor-Roper, p. 137.
72 TNA, WO 208/3788, Cameron to Ramsbotham [26/11/1945] and TNA, WO 208/3787, 'The Death of Hitler', p. 35.
73 TNA, WO 208/3788, Searle to Trevor-Roper [30/11/1945].
74 TNA, WO 208/3789, Wethered to Ramsbotham [27/12/1945].
75 TNA, WO 208/3781, Daily Telegraph and Der Kurier [02/01/1946] and 'Alleged Discovery of Hitler’s Body' [03/01/1946].
76 TNA, WO 208/3781, Memorandum [07/01/1946].
77 TNA, WO 208/3781, 'Alleged Discovery of Hitler’s Body' [03/01/1946] and telegram to Halor [07/01/1946].
78 TNA, WO 208/3789, QIC Minutes [10/01/1946].
79 TNA, WO 208/3781, Dubrovski to Jennings [12/06/1946].
80 TNA, WO 208/3781, 'Von Below' [14/06/1946] and 'Von Below' [03/06/1945]. See also Vinogradov, Pogonyi and Teptzov [eds], KGB, pp. 22,117-118.
81 Vinogradov, Pogonyi and Teptzov [eds], KGB, p. 26.
82 TNA, FO 371/46749, FO Minutes [09/10/1945] and [12/09/1945].
83 Moore and Barret [eds], Killed, pp. 136,138. See also McKale, Survival, pp. 40-41,53-55,63; Joachimsthaler, Hitler, pp. 248-250; O’Donnell, Bunker, p. 302; Antony Beevor, Berlin: The Downfall 1945 [London, Penguin, 2003], pp. 425-426; Trevor-Roper, Hitler, pp. l-li.
84 McKale, Survival, p. 73. See also Eberle and Uhl [eds], Book, p. xxiv.
85 Professor Norman Stone on 'Timewatch, Hitler’s Death: The Final Report', UK television broadcast 30/04/1995. See also Petrova and Watson, Death, pp. 86-87
86 Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Secret World, Behind the Curtain of British Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War [London: I.B. Tauris, 2014], p. viiii.